Loading analysis...
Venture Global: An LNG Expansion Story Depressed by Litigation Overhang
Show original post
TLDR: VG is a hated, filthy play where the market is losing its mind over leverage and lawsuits while ignoring that this thing is about to become an absolute LNG monster. If Plaquemines ramps, BP damages don't completely bankrupt them, and CP2 stays on track, this thing gets re-rated hard. The market is pricing it like a courtroom coin flip instead of valuing the massive incoming cash flow.
Everyone here wants a stock after it already 5x'd, then calls you a bagholder if you try to pitch one before the easy gains are completely obvious.
I posted a longer VG DD earlier and it got sent to heaven and hell in about 30 minutes. A few people debated numbers, but the rest just screamed AI slop, bagholder, insider pump, and every other WSB classic until the mods nuked it. Go ahead and nuke this one too.
I ignored Venture Global ($VG) at first because it looked like another cheap energy stock drowning in debt and legal disasters. But the market is pricing this like a bankrupt courtroom coin flip while ignoring that it's about to become one of the bigger LNG exporters if they don't trip over themselves.
Look at the capacity numbers. Calcasieu Pass is running 12.4 MTPA. Plaquemines is 28.0 MTPA. CP2 is 29.0 MTPA. That's almost 70 MTPA of capacity if they don't screw up execution. For comparison, Cheniere is around 51 MTPA today and sits at a $55B+ market cap. VG is sitting at a $27B cap right now around $11/share and guiding for $8.2B-$8.5B EBITDA in 2026.
The lawsuit overhang is what everyone is choking on. During Calcasieu's commissioning, Russia invaded Ukraine, LNG spot prices went parabolic, and VG sold gas into the spot market instead of giving it to long-term contract guys like BP and Shell. It looks sketchy, but the legal tail risk is tightening up. Shell and Repsol rulings actually favored VG, and Edison and Unipec settled. BP is the only massive elephant left. They won on liability, so now it's just about damages. If it's $1B-$2B, it sucks but they live. If it's $5B+, we're cooked. That's the actual gamble here.
As for the $37B+ debt - yeah, it's massive. This isn't some safe little compounder, it's a heavily levered play. But they just locked in $15B of financing for CP2 and pushed their debt out to the mid-2030s. Everyone knows they have debt, the only question that matters is if EBITDA ramps fast enough to cover it.
Also yeah, I saw the "I worked there and it's a toxic dumpster fire" comments. Glassdoor reviews basically say great pay, overworked people, and rough management. Fine. I'm not trying to date the company. A company can be miserable to work for and still make shareholders money. People said the same emotional stuff when I posted UNH after it sold off. Batshit company, I'm toast, Wendy's, whatever. I made money because the trade was about risk/reward, not employee vibes.
The "nobody trusts them" bear case also looks weak. If buyers actually hated them enough to walk, they'd walk. Instead, guys like Mitsui, Tokyo Gas, TotalEnergies, and EnBW are still signing long-term deals with VG even after the arbitration mess. They might hate management, but they want the gas.
Qatar ramping North Field supply faster is a real price risk, but my VG bet is about Plaquemines ramping successfully and long-term contracts turning into actual cash flow. Qatar can pressure pricing, but buyers don't just get to rip up 20-year deals because more gas shows up. Plus, Hormuz is still a massive geopolitical chokepoint. If things get spicy in the Middle East, U.S. Gulf Coast LNG starts looking a lot more useful for diversification.
The most interesting part to me is the Waha gas angle. Most people model LNG using Henry Hub prices. VG is trying to source cheaper Permian gas from Waha, where prices literally collapse toward zero when pipelines get choked. If they can get CP2 feedgas at $1.20 instead of Henry Hub at $2.50, that's a massive cost edge. On 29 MTPA, that's easily $1.5B+ in annual savings if the math holds up. They're also building internal processing units (NRUs) to clean up cheap off-spec gas themselves and keep midstream margins.
AI data centers need insane power too, and natural gas is going to feed that whether environmentalists like it or not. Utilities still need power that actually shows up when the sun isn't shining and the wind isn't doing charity work.
The big catalyst is Plaquemines in 2026. If it reaches commercial operations and ramps up, the narrative flips from "can these guys build a project?" to "they are printing cash at scale." That's when the market stops treating this like a courtroom coin flip and starts repricing it more like a major LNG infrastructure platform.
Lastly, there's some weird Dec 2026 options open interest. Like 87k contracts on the $12.50 calls and 88k on the $7.50 puts. Same expiration. Probably a collar or some institutional hedge, idk, someone with more wrinkles can explain it in the comments. I'm just watching the business.
Position: 1,850 shares
350 shares in Roth
10 Jan 2028 $10 calls.
Clown me in 2028 if I'm wrong.
The target discussed by the poster is Venture Global (VG). The core view is that the market is pricing it as a highly leveraged, litigation-ridden “courtroom coin flip,” while underestimating the potential cash-flow re-rating that could come after its LNG capacity expansion. The post has no image attachments. The poster’s evidence chain starts with capacity: Calcasieu Pass is operating, Plaquemines is under construction and commissioning, and CP2 has advanced, totaling close to 70 MTPA. Using Cheniere’s roughly 51 MTPA and tens of billions of dollars in market value as a reference, the poster argues that VG’s roughly $110 share price and approximately $27 billion market cap are not expensive relative to the company’s 2026 Adjusted EBITDA guidance of $8.2 billion to $8.5 billion. Second, the poster believes the litigation discount may be overdone: during Calcasieu Pass commissioning, the Russia-Ukraine war pushed LNG spot prices higher, and VG was accused by long-term buyers such as BP, Shell, and Repsol of delaying the declaration of commercial operations and selling cargoes into the spot market. The poster acknowledges that the conduct looks very bad, but emphasizes that outcomes related to Shell and Repsol and some settlements have reduced tail risk. The real major variable is the final damages amount after BP has already prevailed on liability. The poster views roughly $1 billion to $2 billion as manageable, while damages of $5 billion or more would seriously hurt equity value. Third, the poster does not deny more than $30 billion of debt and poor employer reviews, but defines this as a typical highly leveraged project-finance bet: as long as Plaquemines reaches commercial operations in 2026 and ramps steadily, and CP2 proceeds according to plan, EBITDA growth should be sufficient to absorb debt pressure, and the market narrative could shift from “can they build it?” to “scaled cash printing.” The poster also adds buyer-trust and cost-side logic: Mitsui, Tokyo Gas, TotalEnergies, EnBW, and others are still signing long-term contracts, suggesting that customers may dislike management but still need U.S. LNG. If VG can use low-cost Permian Waha gas rather than modeling costs entirely off Henry Hub, especially if CP2 uses cheaper feedgas, plus self-built NRU facilities to process lower-quality gas, it could theoretically create a large cost advantage. Macro catalysts include AI data centers and electricity demand driving natural gas demand, Europe moving away from Russian gas, and geopolitical risks such as the Strait of Hormuz increasing the diversification value of U.S. Gulf Coast LNG. The poster discloses a position of 1,850 shares, including 350 shares in a Roth account, plus 10 call options expiring in January 2028 with a $10 strike; the poster also notes large open interest in December 2026 $12.5 calls and $7.5 puts, speculating that this may be a collar or institutional hedge. The biggest weaknesses are: BP damages could in fact exceed the poster’s “manageable” range, and other pending arbitrations could still add up; the company’s EBITDA guidance is highly dependent on Plaquemines reliability, the mix of spot and contracted cargoes, and TTF/JKM/Henry Hub spreads; although debt maturities are relatively long-dated, the absolute amount is very large; and simply extrapolating Waha cost advantages into more than $1.5 billion of annual savings at CP2 may ignore constraints related to pipeline transportation, basis, available volumes, contracts, and processing costs.
The comment sample is small and contains many memes. Supporters agree with the LNG demand, power demand, and long-term contract logic, while noting that another 12-18 months are still needed for construction, vessel deliveries, and cash-flow realization. Critics mainly focus on bankruptcy and litigation risks, questioning why the poster would deny a discount if they acknowledge possible bankruptcy. A highly upvoted comment also links VG’s price action to TTF gas prices, technical gaps, new supply from the U.S. and Qatar, and the possible return of Russian gas to Europe, leaning toward waiting for a lower price. Another user treats WSB as a contrarian indicator. Overall, the discussion is clearly divided.
Loading Truth Social...
Loading live updates...