The core ticker discussed by the OP is Microsoft (MSFT). The conclusion is that Microsoft is undervalued after its recent pullback, so the OP is adding to the position in batches using long-dated options (LEAPS). The evidence chain mainly comes from two charts: the first puts MSFT, Alphabet/GOOG, and Amazon/AMZN on the same TradingView chart for stock-price performance since January 2024, noting that Microsoft has roughly gone from $382 back to about $382 in June 2026, for a return of about 0%, while Alphabet rose from about $141 to about $364, or around +158%, and Amazon rose from about $152 to about $240, or around +58%; the chart also notes that Microsoft’s P/E was about 36-38 at the start of 2024, versus about 21-22 now. The second chart shows Microsoft’s P/E range over roughly the past 10 years. The author believes that, aside from distortion caused by the 2018 U.S. tax reform, Microsoft’s valuation has generally fluctuated between about 22x and 39x, with the current 22.8x close to the bottom of the range, while it has reached 39x multiple times historically and the normal average is around 30-35x. From this, the author interprets “a flat stock price plus profit growth causing P/E compression” as an opportunity for valuation repair rather than a deterioration in fundamentals. On the fundamental narrative, the author acknowledges that AI and data-center CapEx are very high, but believes these expenditures will show up in Azure growth, and that the binding relationship between OpenAI/ChatGPT and Microsoft Cloud will provide underlying support for Azure demand. The author also believes there is still substantial room for cloud migration and enterprise cloud usage, so they do not think current investment will become sunk cost or overcapacity. In terms of positioning, the title says “Full Port,” but in the comments the OP clarifies that they still have 60% cash and are only continuing to deploy capital. The main post does not provide specific contract strikes, expirations, costs, price targets, or a valuation model; it only describes the trading actions of “buying LEAPS 2 weeks ago, buying more last Friday, and buying more if it keeps falling or moves sideways.” The most important implicit assumptions are: Microsoft’s profit growth can continue, the return on AI CapEx is sufficient to cover the cost of capital, OpenAI demand will still mainly land on Azure, and the market will be willing to re-rate Microsoft’s P/E from the low 20s back above 30x. The main weaknesses are also obvious: the author uses historical P/E ranges and peer stock-price performance to infer undervaluation, but does not break down revenue, EPS, free cash flow, depreciation, AI gross margins, the capital-expenditure cycle, or differences in relative growth; the gains in GOOG and AMZN since 2024 do not directly prove that MSFT should catch up; if the market’s concern is that high CapEx will drag down future FCF, that OpenAI has bargaining power, or that cloud competition is intensifying, then the low P/E may be a risk repricing rather than merely an unjustified selloff.