The stock discussed by the poster is NuScale Power (SMR). The core argument is a warning to the community not to be drawn in by the SMR theme or NuScale’s small modular reactor project in Doicești, Romania. The poster argues that the project looks more like a political and financing narrative than an executable commercial engineering project. Citing reporting from Romanian outlet G4Media, the poster says Nuclearelectrica has already invested about 2亿欧元/over 10亿 lei in the Doicești project, while Romanian Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan has publicly mentioned spending of more than $2.4亿美元. Yet so far the results consist mainly of land, company operations, and feasibility studies, with no actual reactor built. The post interprets this as evidence that NuScale’s technology faces difficulty reaching commercial deployment: SMRs look advanced in investor materials and government cooperation frameworks, but real construction costs, financing needs, and electricity price competitiveness may be too high. The poster also specifically emphasizes a suspicious land transaction: Nova Power & Gas previously acquired assets related to the old Doicești thermal power plant for about 510万 euros, then sold land for the future power plant to RoPower Nuclear for about 2400万 euros; the poster describes this as “3000万,” with the broader point being that a land transaction in a Romanian village appears unusually expensive and may have benefited local/private participants. The post does not provide a clear position, price target, or valuation model, nor does it list NuScale’s revenue, cash, orders, or valuation multiples. Instead, it frames the Romanian project as a negative catalyst: if the project is re-examined, financing fails to materialize, or costs are confirmed to exceed market power prices, the SMR share price could come under pressure as expectations for one of the “first global commercial projects” are reduced. The author’s implicit assumptions include: Doicești is a key proof point for NuScale’s commercialization credibility; money spent without construction is equivalent to project infeasibility; government partnerships are more political promotion than economic validation; and the absence of any completed NuScale commercial module means the market is underestimating technology and cost risks. The most important weaknesses are also clear: first, official materials show that Nuclearelectrica shareholders approved the Final Investment Decision in 2026年2月 and the project entered Pre-EPC/the third stage, so it has not been formally cancelled; second, it is not unusual for nuclear projects to spend years in early-stage work such as FEED, permitting, geology, supply chain, and financing arrangements, so “no physical reactor” alone does not directly prove fraud; third, the poster connects media-reported costs, the prime minister’s criticism, and the land transaction into a “scam” narrative, but does not prove that NuScale itself participated in improper transactions. NuScale’s own investor materials also acknowledge that the project still needs to secure Pre-EPC financing, making it a high-risk early commercialization project rather than a fully committed construction project. Overall, the post is a bearish warning about the SMR narrative, with evidence focused on the Romanian project’s costs, political controversy, and unbuilt status, but it lacks a complete financial valuation and a systematic comparison with NuScale’s other partnership projects.