The target discussed by the OP is Peabody Energy (BTU). The core idea is to use the private-market transaction price from Anglo American’s recently announced sale of its Australian coking coal assets to infer the implied value of BTU’s metallurgical coal business. The main post says Anglo sold its Australian steelmaking coal business to Dhilmar for up to $3.875 billion, including $2.3 billion in upfront cash and the remainder as a coal-price-linked earnout; based on the OP’s stated 306 million tonnes of saleable reserves and 14 million tonnes of current annual production, this equates to about $12.66 per tonne of reserves and about $276.79 per tonne of annual production capacity. The OP then applies this production-capacity multiple to BTU, arguing that the market still treats BTU as a traditional U.S. thermal coal company while undervaluing its combination of Australian seaborne thermal coal and metallurgical coal assets, especially the Centurion mine in Queensland’s Bowen Basin. The post claims Centurion’s longwall system began production ahead of schedule in February 2026, that 2026 output can reach 3.5 million tonnes, and that output can rise to 4.7 million tonnes by 2028, bringing BTU’s 2026 metallurgical coal production guidance midpoint to 10.8 million tonnes. Applying the Anglo transaction’s per-tonne annual production multiple to 10.8 million tonnes, the OP derives a standalone value of about $2.99 billion for BTU’s metallurgical coal business, close to the approximately $3.02 billion market capitalization the OP cites; if Centurion reaches full production, the metallurgical coal business could exceed $3.3 billion. On that basis, the OP argues investors are effectively paying almost only for the coking coal business, while getting the thermal coal business for free. The main post further states that BTU’s thermal coal business sold 122 million tonnes last year and contributed $455 million of adjusted EBITDA, including both high-margin seaborne thermal coal sold into Asian markets and U.S. utility contracts. On valuation, the author estimates BTU’s fair equity value at $5.5-6.0 billion, implying 80%-100% rerating upside versus the current roughly $2.9-3.0 billion market cap; the disclosed position is 528 shares at a $23.90 cost basis. The image attachment is only a photo of a Peabody Energy building and company signage, not a financial table or position screenshot, and adds no new quantitative evidence to the argument. The main post relies on many implicit assumptions: first, that the Anglo transaction can be used directly as a comparable multiple for BTU’s metallurgical coal assets; second, that Centurion can ramp up according to the original plan; third, that differences in coal prices, quality, costs, jurisdictions, contract structures, and remaining mine lives will not materially compress BTU’s multiple; and fourth, that management will unlock value through buybacks, dividends, or a potential spin-off. The biggest weakness is that the OP uses the maximum total transaction consideration rather than the certain cash consideration, while the earnout itself depends on coal prices; at the same time, the OP directly multiplies a “per tonne of annual production capacity” metric by BTU’s guidance, ignoring Anglo’s asset mix, reserve quality, cost curve, capital expenditures, closure and reclamation liabilities, cyclical coal prices, and regulatory discount. More importantly, BTU’s latest Q1 2026 information indicates delays in the Centurion ramp-up and a lowered full-year production target, which weakens the basis for the OP’s valuation using the 10.8 million-tonne metallurgical coal midpoint. Therefore, the post is a typical relative-valuation mismatch thesis, but its conclusion is highly dependent on transaction comparability and execution risk.